Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept Seen from Southeast Asia: Perceptions, Ambiguities, and Strategic Hedging

Abstract

This paper examines how Southeast Asia received Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept amid intensifying great-power competition and a fragmented post-2022 international order. Drawing on the theoretical framework of strategic hedging, the study argues that Southeast Asian states do not interpret Russia’s new foreign policy as a driver of regional-order restructuring. Instead, they largely incorporate it into existing practices of uncertainty management. Through an analysis of the region’s strategic context, perceptions of Russia’s role, and patterns of strategic ambiguity and selective alignment, the paper demonstrates that Russia is viewed as an important but non-decisive partner in Southeast Asia. While Russia’s discourses on multipolarity and the Global South resonate at a principled level, they have not translated into firm strategic commitments from the region. Rather, Southeast Asian states maintain strategic ambiguity to preserve autonomy and mitigate risks arising from structural confrontation among major powers. The paper contributes to contemporary international relations scholarship by reaffirming the analytical value of the hedging framework in understanding the behavior of middle and small states in an increasingly fragmented global order.

https://doi.org/10.26803/MyRes.2026.03